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1.  SCOPE OF THIS PAPER
On 6 December 2007, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
delivered its ruling in the case of Columbus Container Serv-
ices BVBA & Co. v. Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt (herein-
after ‘Columbus Container Services’).1 The case had awakened 
the interest of scholars before the judgment.2 Neverthe-
less, the decision has created new uncertainties not only 
because it did not answer crucial questions on the facts3 
but also because it seems to have apparently changed – or 
at least modulated – prior decisions of the ECJ. This paper 
will specially focus on these silences and inconsistencies.
In the i rst section, we will briel y describe the facts and 
the ECJ’s judgment. After that, we will consider the ruling 
in a critical way, applying to the case the basic elements 
usually managed by the ECJ in its non- discrimination 
case law and exposing our position that substantially dif-
fers from that held by the Court (section 3). Even if we 
do not share the reasoning and conclusions of the ECJ, we 
will consider the hypothetical consequences of Columbus 
Container Services for other problems at stake, such as rules 
on classii cation of foreign entities, consolidation regimes 
that might imply treaty overrides, or the compatibility of 
the credit method itself with EC law (section 4).
2.  COLUMBUS CONTAINER SERVICES: THE 
FACTS AND THE RULING
Columbus Containers BVBA & Co. is a limited partner-
ship governed by Belgian law whose object comprises the 
coordination (i nance, marketing, management, and book-
keeping) of the activities performed by an international 
group. Its shares were held by eight natural persons resid-
ing in Germany (80%) and a German partnership (20%) 
whose partners also resided in Germany.
According to Belgian law, Columbus is a taxable per-
son falling under the scope of the ‘coordination centre’ 
regime that grants far-reaching tax advantages. On the 
other hand, under German tax law, Columbus was treated 
as a transparent partnership and its proi ts were assigned 
to the partners residing in Germany.
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Under the Belgium-Germany tax treaty, Germany 
applies the exemption method for income derived from 
capital invested in a Belgian limited partnership.  German-
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules (sections 7 to 
14 Außensteuergesetz; Foreign Tax Act) do not cover branch 
proi ts. In order to avoid possible circumvention of these 
rules, section 20 (2) of the Foreign Tax Act contains a 
special provision that taxes foreign permanent establish-
ments with passive investment income in low-tax juris-
dictions applying the credit method rather than by way 
of  exemption.
German tax authorities applied these provisions, and 
Columbus challenged the decision before the Courts. The 
Finanzgericht Münster referred the case to the ECJ for a pre-
liminary ruling asking whether Articles 43 and 56 EC must 
be interpreted as precluding tax legislation of a Member 
State under which the income of a resident national derived 
from capital invested in an establishment having its regis-
tered ofi ce in another Member State is, notwithstanding 
the existence of a double taxation convention (DTC) con-
cluded with the Member State in which that establishment 
has its registered ofi ce, not exempted from national income 
tax but is subject to national taxation against which the tax 
paid in the other Member State is set-off.
The ECJ i rst stated that the situation under considera-
tion was covered by the treaty provisions on the freedom 
of establishment.4 After this, the Court analyzed the hypo-
thetical restriction on the fundamental freedom but just 
answering one of the questions usually raised in relation to 
it. Preliminary rulings concerning direct taxation and EU 
fundamental freedoms usually imply two questions: does 
an internal provision restrict the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom, and, in that case, is the restriction justii ed?
However, as stated before, the ECJ avoided the second 
question by simply refusing the existence of a restriction 
in the case referred. The Court indicated that the  German 
switch-over clause had made no distinction between taxa-
tion of income from a domestic partnership and from a 
partnership residing in a different Member State.5 By 
means of this vertical analysis (migrant/non-migrant test), 
the ECJ declined to apply the horizontal approach, which 
had been suggested by AG Mengozzi.6 This rel ection 
saved the ECJ from having to consider the difi cult task of 
a possible justii cation for German rules under analysis.
The ruling i nishes with several obvious and perhaps 
unnecessary statements. It states that the Court has no 
jurisdiction to rule on the possible infringement of the 
provisions of double tax conventions by a contracting 
Member State. Following the Advocate General’s (AG’s) 
Opinion, the ECJ states that it may not examine the rela-
tionship between a national measure, such as that in issue 
in the main proceedings, and the provisions of a DTC, 
such as the Bilateral Tax Convention, since that question 
does not fall within the scope of Community law.7
3.  CRITICAL REVISION: HORIZONTAL 
COMPARABILITY AND JUSTIFICATION TEST
It is obvious that the issue of comparability constitutes 
a previous question in Columbus Container Services and, 
we might say, in any pronouncement related to virtual 
restrictions on European fundamental freedoms. As we 
have seen, if two cross-border situations are not consid-
ered to be comparable, no restriction analysis will be wise. 
If, on the other hand, a horizontal test is to be applied, 
we may i nd a restriction on fundamental freedoms and, 
in that case, a justii cation analysis will be pertinent. In 
this section, we will try to develop this two-step analysis, 
dealing with the question of possible justii cations for the 
restrictions that the ECJ left unanswered.
3.1.  Vertical and Horizontal 
Non-discrimination
The question of whether EC law protects against horizon-
tal tax discrimination may be considered crucial in two 
different points of view. On the one hand, and specially 
referring to Columbus Container Services, a strict vertical 
comparison approach precludes further analysis on the 
case. On the other hand, its acceptance might partly rede-
i ne the very concept of non-discrimination,8 although not 
with the effects that have been sometimes described.
As stated before, the ECJ easily rejected horizontal 
comparability bringing up the migrant/non-migrant test 
as described in Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v. 
Belgische Staat (hereinafter ‘Kerckhaert-Morres’).9 Accord-
ing to this, German tax legislation does not make any 
distinction between taxation of income derived from the 
proi ts of partnerships established in Germany and taxa-
tion of income derived from the proi ts of partnerships 
established in another Member State, which subjects the 
proi ts made by those partnerships in that State to a rate 
of tax below 30%. By applying the set-off method to such 
foreign partnerships, that legislation merely subjects, in 
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Germany, the proi ts made by such partnerships to the 
same tax rate as proi ts made by partnerships established 
in Germany. And, consequently, since partnerships such 
as Columbus do not suffer any tax disadvantage in com-
parison with partnerships established in Germany, there is 
no discrimination resulting from a difference in treatment 
between those two categories of partnerships.10 When 
confronted with the submission of Columbus that the pro-
visions of the AStG lead to a distortion of the choice that 
companies and partnerships have to establish themselves 
in different Member States, the ECJ merely answers that 
Member States enjoy a certain autonomy and it follows 
from that tax competence that the freedom of companies 
and partnerships to choose, for the purposes of establish-
ment, between different Member States in no way means 
that the latter are obliged to adapt their own tax systems 
to the different systems of tax of the other Member States 
in order to guarantee that a company or partnership that 
has chosen to establish itself in a given Member State is 
taxed, at national level, in the same way as a company or 
partnership that has chosen to establish itself in another 
Member State.11
In order to ascertain whether a horizontal approach 
might be i tting for a case such as the Columbus Container 
Services, we will consider several issues. First, we should 
(1) consider the special importance given by the ECJ to 
the ‘Kerckhaert-Morres approach’ when dealing with a case 
such as the Columbus Container Services. After that, we will 
(2) weigh the pros and the cons of horizontal comparability 
considering the special virtues of this non-discrimination 
approach, (3) analyzing if and, in case, to what extent it 
has been admitted by the ECJ’s case law.
3.1.1.  Kerckhaert-Morres and Horizontal 
Comparability
As stated before, the ECJ in Columbus Container Services 
made wide use of the rel ections contained in Kerckhaert-
Morres, putting forward that German tax legislation in 
issue was comparable in this respect to the Belgian tax 
legislation that was applied in the former case.12 Also, a 
large number of authors have stressed the strong resem-
blance to Columbus Container Services.13
In Kerckhaert-Morres, the ECJ considered Belgian divi-
dend taxation rules under the free movement of capital 
provision contained in the EC Treaty. These rules made 
dividends from shares in companies established in  Belgium 
and dividends from shares in companies established in 
another Member State subject to the same uniform rate 
of taxation. Nevertheless, Belgium did not provide for the 
possibility of setting off the tax levied by deduction at 
source in France, overriding thereby the Belgium-France 
DTC. The ECJ, applying a migrant/non-migrant test, 
considered that the adverse consequences that might arise 
from the application of an income tax system such as the 
Belgian system resulted from the exercise in parallel by 
two Member States of their i scal sovereignty.
According to this description, we do not consider that 
Columbus Container Services and Kerckhaert-Morres are to 
be considered similar or comparable cases. As we have 
already stated, the most complicated issue in Columbus 
Container Services is determining whether or not two cross-
border situations may be considered comparable, provid-
ing thereby a possibility to consider the existence of a 
restriction of fundamental freedoms. Obviously, applying 
case law based upon vertical comparison considerations to 
Columbus Container Services seems totally incongruous. In 
the last two decades, the ECJ jurisprudence on direct taxa-
tion and treaty freedoms has been changing and broad-
ening its scope. Initially referred to so-called ‘inbound 
situations’ (source state treatment of non-residents), the 
Court had to deal relatively early with ‘outbound situ-
ations’ (home state treatment of residents performing 
cross-border activities). To deny the existence of a restric-
tion in an outbound situation, applying ‘inbound case law’, 
would have been so inconsistent as it is refusing horizontal 
comparability on a migrant/non-migrant test approach. 
The Court should have analyzed the consistency of the 
horizontal comparability within treaty freedoms instead 
of ignoring the problem by using a concept that is not 
directly related to the case.
There is a last issue that must be analyzed in rela-
tion to this problem. Kerckhaert-Morres is not the only 
ruling referring to the migrant/non-migrant test (verti-
cal approach). Rather, the opposite is true. In relation to 
direct taxation, all cases, except for those dealing with 
horizontal discriminations, have to be based upon a clas-
sical migrant/non-migrant approach. Why then such an 
insistence on Kerckhaert-Morres, which is merely an exam-
ple of this vertical approach? In our opinion, there is just 
a single similarity between Columbus Container Services and 
Kerckhaert-Morres: the existence of a treaty override. But 
this point in common does not allow to simply transfer 
the solution of Kerckhaert-Morres to Columbus Container 
Services. It is not the treaty override itself that hypotheti-
cally constitutes a restriction of fundamental freedoms 
because even in a treaty override situation, it would be 
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different if the replacement of the exemption method 
by the set-off method applied irrespective of the rate at 
which the income in question was taxed in Germany. In 
that situation, any unfavourable treatment caused by the 
application of that method to similar income of German 
taxpayers derived from permanent establishments located 
abroad would depend essentially on the level of tax lev-
ied in each of the Member States. It would in that case 
be unfavourable treatment arising from the coexistence of 
the different tax legislations of the Member States. How-
ever, that is certainly not the case in Columbus Container 
 Services.14
Our conclusion turns out to be the same: the acceptance 
of the comparability of cross-border situations and, there-
fore, of horizontal discrimination is the real point at stake 
in Columbus Container Services.15
3.1.2.  Horizontal Comparability and Horizontal 
Tax Discrimination: Is It Acceptable Under 
Theoretical Arguments?
Horizontal comparability has become a controversial issue 
at the academic level in recent years. Nevertheless, the 
rel ections on this problem have merely focused on the 
acceptance of this comparison in ECJ case law. In short, 
instead of discussing possible grounds for this particular 
approach, most authors analyze the evolution of the ECJ’s 
case law on horizontal comparability studying if, and to 
what extent, this peculiar comparison has been admit-
ted.16 We do not consider that these rel ections must be 
ignored; nevertheless, in order to offer a proper solution 
for Columbus Container Services and similar cases, we should 
pay attention to possible theoretical pillars upon which 
horizontal comparability might be based.
Just AG’s Opinions provide certain background in 
favour of horizontal comparability. So, AG Léger, in 
 Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (hereinafter ‘Cadbury 
Schweppes’), stated that not admitting this comparison 
would be tantamount to conceding that a Member State 
is entitled to choose the other Member States in which its 
domestic companies may establish subsidiaries with the 
benei t of the tax regime applicable in the host state. Such 
a situation would manifestly lead to a result contrary to the 
very notion of ‘single market’.17 Following the same line 
of thought, AG Mengozzi suggests that national meas-
ures such as those referred to in Columbus Container Services 
and Cadbury Schweppes should be regarded as having the 
effect of fragmenting the common market by encouraging 
German nationals to establish themselves only in Member 
States where the level of taxation is equal to or above the 
German rate provided for in the AStG. Some authors have 
also relied on the ‘common/internal market argument’,18 
reinforcing it on the basis of a striking image provided by 
Frans Vanistendael. A prohibition with regard to restric-
tions on fundamental freedoms views the EU market as a 
whole where all economic actors can move from one end 
to the other. It views the EU market as a huge snooker 
table, where all the economic balls roll smoothly from one 
corner to the other.19
If, as generally stated, fundamental freedoms pursue 
one essential aim that is identii ed with the achievement 
of an EU-wide internal market,20 potential restrictions 
on fundamental freedoms must be considered taking this 
objective into account. In our opinion, it does not seem 
to be arguable that a different and selective treatment of 
identical, similar, or comparable cross-border activities 
might lead to fragmentation of the common market. In 
fact, the ‘common market approach’ has been used in legal 
writing in order to justify horizontal comparability in 
 several situations.21
Once we have found a legal background for horizontal 
comparability, the moment has come to analyze its accept-
ance in the ECJ’s case law.
3.1.3.  Case Law on Horizontal Comparability: 
Is It Recognized by the ECJ?
The case law of the ECJ on cross-border situations’ com-
parability has been said to be meager.22 In our opinion, 
Notes
14 This is the position of AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, Case No. C-298/05, Columbus Containers, paras 129.
15 Other authors have also considered this the key issue of Columbus: Opinion Statement of the CFE (hereinafter ‘CFE’), 3.
16 This type of analysis might be found in Cordewener (2007), n. 2, n. 3, 210-212; Hohenwarter, ‘The Allocation of Taxing Rights in the Light of the Fundamental Freedoms 
of EC Law’, in Tax Treaty Law and EC Law, eds Lang, Schuch, & Staringer (Vienna: Linde, 2007), 100-102; Kemmeren, ‘The Internal Market Approach Should Prevail over 
the Single Country Approach’, in A Vision of Taxes Within and Outside European Borders. Festschrift in Honour of Prof. Dr Frans Vanistendael (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 
2008), 575-576; Lang (2008), n. 2, 685-692.
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no. 1 (2006), 73; Cordewener (2007), n. 2, 211; Cordewener (2008), n. 2, 230.
19 Vanistendael, ‘The Compatibility of the Basic Economic Freedoms with the Sovereign National Tax Systems of the Member States’, EC Tax Review (2003), 139.
20 Cordewener, ‘The Prohibitions of Discrimination and Restriction within the Framework of the Fully Integrated Internal Market’, in EU Freedoms and Taxation, ed. Frans 
Vanistendael (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006), 4-5.
21 Kol er & Schindler, ‘Dancing with Mr D: The ECJ’s Denial of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in the “D” Case’, European Taxation, Dec. (2005), 531; Hohenwarter, n. 16, 
120; Cordewener (2006), n. 20, 25; Cordewener (2007), n. 2, 211.
22 Hohenwarter, n. 16, 100.
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the situation might be considered even worse; the real 
problem is not about lack of rulings but about lack of 
consistency in the case law. Therefore, we must consider 
different groups of rulings in which the ECJ has accepted 
or rejected horizontal comparability and check whether 
the case law is inconsistent and, in that case, why it is so.
The ECJ has considered a possible comparison of 
cross-border situations under the heading of three differ-
ent points of view: the ‘Principle of Neutrality of Legal 
Form’, the ‘most-favoured-nation treatment’ (MFN), and 
the CFC (also quasi-CFC) legislation.23 We should briel y 
analyze these three groups of cases.
Horizontal rel ections in the context of the principle of 
neutrality of legal form are not new. Already in Commission 
of the European Communities v. French Republic (hereinafter 
‘Avoir Fiscal’),24 the ECJ stated that the i rst paragraph 
of Article 52 of the Treaty expressly leaves traders free 
to choose the appropriate legal form in which to pursue 
their activities in another Member State and that free-
dom of choice must not be limited by discriminatory 
provisions.25 As it has been declared, at the very begin-
ning, no importance was attached to this statement.26 
Nevertheless, in subsequent cases such as Compagnie de 
Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v.  Finanzamt 
Aachen- Innenstadt (hereinafter ‘Saint Gobain’)27 and recently 
CLT-UFA S.A. v. Finanzamt Koln-West (hereinafter ‘CLT-
UFA’),28 the ECJ adopted this same rationale. In our opin-
ion, this vested case law on the principle of neutrality of 
legal form does not set a precedent in relation to horizon-
tal comparability in cases such as the Columbus Container 
Services for the following reasons.
First of all, the principle of ‘free choice of legal form’ in 
the cases cited above refers to inbound investment situa-
tions. Its application to outbound situations, such as that 
analyzed in Columbus Container Services, is rather question-
able. In some cases such as Marks & Spencer plc v. David 
Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), the ECJ merely 
avoided the problem,29 which, by the way, could not pass 
unnoticed for the ECJ since AG Poaires Maduro, in his 
opinion, had explicitly rejected horizontal comparability.30 
In other cases such as Columbus Container Services, the Court 
simply rejected the application of the principle, resorting 
to the l eeting concept of ‘i scal autonomy’.31 The reasons 
for this different approach to the principle of free choice of 
legal form, depending on the inbound or outbound char-
acter of the investment, remain unexplained. Neverthe-
less, the second argument in order to reject the acceptance 
of this principle as an embedded support for horizontal 
comparability might give a clue on this issue.
It is a common assumption among scholars that in cases 
such as the Avoir Fiscal, Saint Gobain, and CLT-UFA, the 
problem at stake could have been also resolved on the basis 
of the classical migrant/non-migrant test (that is,  vertical 
pair of comparison).32 Effectively, these cases involved 
unfavourable treatment of branches in the host state, 
therefore, non-migrant situations, and could be resolved 
under the scope of a typical vertical approach.
In short, neither the acceptance of the principle of free 
choice of legal form in inbound situations nor its refusal 
for outbound investments sheds light on the acceptance of 
horizontal comparability by the ECJ.
Horizontal comparability in the ECJ case law has been 
also analyzed in regard to the issue of MFN treatment. 
Assuming that the essential core of the concept of MFN 
is that a state accepts an obligation not to discriminate 
against subjects of another state vis-a-vis subjects of a 
third state,33 some authors have drawn their conclusions 
in relation to horizontal comparability. The acceptance or 
refusal of MFN implies the corresponding acceptance or 
refusal of horizontal comparability.34 On the other hand, 
the acceptance of horizontal comparability in cases not 
directly related to the application of DTC’s will open the 
door to MFN treatment.35 In our opinion, none of these 
statements can be shared.
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Of course, one could always claim that the denial of 
MFN in the case law of the ECJ36 was wrong because it 
was based on the questionable idea that persons covered 
by a tax treaty were per se incomparable with other per-
sons.37 Nevertheless, the question of MFN is so far-reach-
ing and complicated that its treatment in an article like 
this seems inappropriate. A better approach could be to 
analyze the pillars upon which the ECJ has denied a hori-
zontal comparison in cases such as D. v. Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst (hereinafter ‘D.’) or Test Claimants in Class IV 
of the ACT Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Rev-
enue (hereinafter ‘ACT’) and to decide whether or not these 
may be suitable for every comparison between migrant 
situations.
The grounds offered by the ECJ in D. and ACT. are 
identical:
The fact that those reciprocal rights and obligations apply 
only to persons resident in one of the two  Contracting 
Member States is an inherent consequence of bilateral 
double taxation conventions’;38 the benei t laid down 
in the DTC ‘cannot be regarded as a benei t separable 
from the remainder of the Convention, but is an integral 
part thereof and contributes to its overall balance.’39
Of course these arguments cannot be extrapolated to 
cases in which no DTC is at stake40 and, specii cally, to 
those like Columbus in which the provisions involved are 
unilateral deviations of treaties.41 Therefore, the rejection 
of MFN by the ECJ does not clarify the problem of hori-
zontal comparability.
And hence, we come to the issue in relation to which 
horizontal pairs of comparison have been admitted by 
the ECJ. We are referring to Cadbury Schweppes concern-
ing the compatibility of the British CFC rules with the 
 fundamental freedoms.42 It is true that the admission of 
horizontal comparability is not explicit in the ruling43 or 
at least ‘as explicit’ as that contained in the Opinion of AG 
Léger in the case.44 This might be the reason that several 
scholars reject the very existence of horizontal compari-
son in Cadbury Schweppes.45 Nevertheless, in our opinion,46 
besides a traditional comparison between a cross-border 
situation and a domestic situation, Cadbury Schweppes 
introduces a more original comparison between two cross-
border situations (horizontal):
Even taking into account, as suggested by the United 
Kingdom, Danish, German, French, Portuguese, 
 Finnish, and Swedish Governments, the fact referred 
to by the national court that such a resident company 
does not pay, on the proi ts of a CFC within the scope 
of application of that legislation, more tax than that 
which would have been payable on those proi ts if they 
had been made by a subsidiary established in the United 
Kingdom, the fact remains that under such legislation 
the resident company is taxed on proi ts of another legal 
person. That is not the case for a resident company with 
a subsidiary taxed in the United Kingdom or a subsidi-
ary established outside that Member State which is not 
subject to a lower level of taxation.47
It is true that, in cases referred to the principle of 
free choice of legal form in inbound situations, Cadbury 
Schweppes could be resolved on the basis of both vertical 
and horizontal comparability. Nevertheless, there is a sig-
nii cant difference: as against cases like Avoir Fiscal, Saint 
Gobain, and CLT-UFA, in Cadbury Schweppes, there is an 
explicit recognition of horizontal pairs of comparison.
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether the 
two parts of the comparison criteria used by the Court 
in Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas are to 
be applied individually or cumulatively. In other words, 
Notes
36 Case No. C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst (hereinafter ‘D.’), and Case No. C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v. Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue (hereinafter ‘ACT’).
37 Cordewener (2007), n. 2, 211.
38 Case No. C-376/03 D., para. 61; Case No. C-374/04 ACT, para. 91.
39 Case No. C-376/03 D., para. 62; Case No. C-374/04 ACT, para. 88.
40 Lang (2006), n. 29, 399; Hohenwarter, n. 16, 101, but in relation to Cadbury Schweppes.
41 Haslinger, ‘Switch-Over bei Veräußerungsgewinnen aus internationalen Schachtelbeteligungen’, Steuer und Wirtschaft International (2005), 175; Cordewener & Schnitger, 
n. 18, 50; Cordewener (2007), n. 2, 212.
42 Case No. C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes.
43 Hohenwarter indicates that the reasoning is ‘less pronounced’: Hohenwarter, n. 16, 101.
44 Léger states: ‘Unlike the United Kingdom, I do not see why Cadbury’s situation should not be compared to that of such a company. I take the view that the assessment 
of the compatibility with Community law of the legislation in question must examine all the ramii cations of that legislation. As we know, “discrimination” is dei ned as 
the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations. The only question to be asked in order to determine 
whether different treatment of two situations is discriminatory is therefore whether those two situations are comparable. I take the view that that is the case in respect of 
Cadbury’s position and that of a resident company which has established a subsidiary in another Member State having a less favourable tax regime than that in effect in the 
International Financial Services Centre because, in either case, a United Kingdom resident company has established a subsidiary in another Member State’ (Opinion of AG 
Léger of 2 May 2006, C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, para. 78).
45 Kessler & Eicke, n. 13, 589; Kemmeren, n. 16, 576.
46 This has been also stated by several authors: Hohenwarter, n. 16, 101; Cordewener (2007), n. 2, 211; CFE, 5; Cordewener (2008), n. 2, 226-227; Lang (2008), n. 2, 687. 
This is contained in AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 114.
47 Case No. C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, para. 45.
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the question could be raised as to whether a difference in 
treatment provided for by the national legislation of the 
taxpayer’s Member State of residence, which applies solely 
between two cross-border situations, is sufi cient in order 
to consider that a restriction on freedom of establishment 
exists.48 This is exactly the case in Columbus Container 
Services. Anyway, the legal background described in the 
former paragraph for horizontal comparability might give 
an answer for this question. This was in fact the solution 
offered by AG Mengozzi in his opinion.49
In short, we must conclude that, despite rejection of hori-
zontal comparability in certain cases (principle of free choice 
of legal form in outbound situations and MFN), there seems 
to be a tendency for the ECJ to accept this pair of com-
parison,50 at least if we analyze the problem according to the 
foundations upon which Cadbury Schweppes was based.
3.2.  Justii cation Test
Once we have concluded that a national provision such as 
that contained in paragraph 20(2) and (3) of the AStG con-
stitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment pro-
vided for by the Treaty, since it is likely to deter German 
nationals from establishing themselves freely in another 
Member State of their choice, it is necessary to consider 
whether such a restriction can be justii ed. For this pur-
pose, the arguments contained in Cadbury Schweppes would 
be of great use. Nevertheless, before analyzing possible 
justii cations for the restriction on freedom of establish-
ment, one should consider whether or not differences 
between Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container Services 
might justify a different approach.
3.2.1.  Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container 
Services: Are They So Different?
It is undoubted there are important differences between 
Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container Services. Never-
theless, once the most important (no vertical  comparability 
in Columbus Container Services) has been considered irrel-
evant in order to justify different solutions for both cases, 
disparities seem hardly acceptable. In short, the non-
application of the ECJ’s case law on anti-avoidance rules 
to a case such as Columbus Container Services is difi cult to 
understand.51
As stated before, the ECJ did not consider in  Columbus 
Container Services the possible application of its Cadbury 
Schweppes anti-avoidance doctrine, as the conclusion that 
the rules contained in the AStG did not constitute a restric-
tion made it unnecessary. Nevertheless, some authors have 
tried to introduce grounds for the disparity.
In this line of thought, Meussen indicated that in 
Columbus Container Services, there is no specii c CFC leg-
islation at stake and therefore this is not a matter of 
deemed income but rather of the attribution of income on 
the basis of income generated through a tax-transparent 
entity. Accordingly, the Cadbury Schweppes arguments do 
not apply in this case.52 In our opinion, this reason for a 
different treatment is not to be shared for the following 
reasons.
It is a common assumption among European scholars 
that the rules contained in sections 20(2) and (3) of the 
German AStG are aimed at avoidance of the CFC rules.53 
And even in some cases, they have been considered CFC54 
or quasi-CFC rules.55 But second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, it does not really matter if the rules contained in the 
AStG are qualii ed or not formally as CFC  provisions. They 
must be considered anti-avoidance or anti- delocalization 
rules, and this might be enough in order to justify a 
 scrutiny under Cadbury Schweppes principles.
There is a ‘hidden difference’ between Cadbury Schweppes 
and Columbus Container Services that might be inl uencing 
the ECJ’s approach. It is a treaty override that gives rise 
to the potential restriction of a fundamental freedoms in 
Columbus Container Services, whereas in Cadbury Schweppes, 
the problem originated from domestic CFC legislation. 
There has been a traditional reluctance of the ECJ to con-
sider the correlation between DTC’s and European Law. 
In any case, this is a reluctance that might be considered 
superseded by a large list of (recent) rulings in which 
the ECJ considered DTC’s provisions in connection with 
domestic rules in order to ascertain whether or not funda-
mental freedoms might have been restricted.56 The ECJ 
Notes
48 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, Case No. C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 119.
49 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, Case No. C-298/05, Columbus Containers, paras 118-122.
50 Hohenwarter, n. 16, 101.
51 In fact, a large number of authors have pleaded for it: CFE, 5-7; Cordewener (2008), n. 2: 228 et seq; Lang (2008), n. 2, 693; Farmer, n. 3, 107-108; de la Feria, ‘Prohibition 
of Abuse of (Community) Law: The Creation of a New General Principle of EC Law through Tax’, Common Market Law Review 45 (2008): 432.
52 Meussen Apr. (2008), n. 13, 172. This same argument might be found in a critical exposition in CFE, 7.
53 Wassermeyer & Schönfeld, in Außensteuerrecht Kommentar (Flick, Wassermeyer & Baumhoff) (Köln: Otto Schmidt, 1973/2007), at sec. 20 Anm. 65, Lfg. 58, Mai 2006. 
Opinion Statement of the CFE ECJ Task Force on ECJ Tax Case No. C-298/05, Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v. Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, 2. Kessler & Eicke, 
n. 13, 588. Farmer, n. 3, 105.
54 Schnitger, ‘German CFC Legislation Pending before the European Court of Justice – Abuse of the Law and Revival of the Most-Favoured-Nation-Clause?’, EC Tax Review 
no. 3 (2006), 156; de la Feria (2008), n. 51, 431.
55 Pistone, ‘Ups and Downs in the Case Law of the ECJ and the Swinging Pendulum of Direct Taxation’, Intertax no. 4 (2008), 147.
56 See Gilly (Case No. C-336/96); Saint-Gobain (C-307/97); AMID (C-141/99); D. (C-376/03); Bouanich (C-265/04); Denkavit International BV, Denkavit France SARL 
(C-170/05); Amurta (C-379/05); Orange European Smallcup Fund (C-194/06); Deutsche Shell (C-293/06); Lidl Belgium (C-414/06); SEVIC (C-411/03); Cartesio (C-210/06) and 
Überseering (C-208/00).
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may not examine the relationship between a national 
measure and the provisions of a DTC, such as the Bilateral 
Tax Convention, since that question does not fall within 
the scope of Community law, but this does not mean that 
the Court is not entitled to consider if a DTC, or its over-
ride, restricts fundamental freedoms. Again, there is no 
ground for the disparity.
The conclusion seems to be clear. There are no signii -
cant differences between Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus 
Container Services. Therefore, the restriction described in 
the latter must be considered under the criteria of the 
former and specially taking into account the crucial con-
cept of wholly artii cial arrangements.
3.2.2.  Is the Restriction Justii ed in Columbus
Before the referring court, the Finanzamt Bielefeld-
 Innenstadt and the German Government claimed that 
the relevant provisions of AStG were justii ed in order to 
counteract harmful tax competition, to prevent wholly 
artii cial arrangements, and to safeguard the cohesion of 
the tax system. Once horizontal comparability has been 
admitted, the justii cation of a restriction in Columbus Con-
tainer  Services is not a difi cult task. An excellent analysis of 
this issue might be found in the opinion of AG Mengozzi 
delivered on the case, which has found extensive accept-
ance in specialized literature.57
AG Mengozzi refused easily that the contested provi-
sions could be justii ed under harmful tax competition 
considerations or the intention to preserve the cohesion of 
the national tax system.
In relation to the i rst hypothetical justii cation ground, 
AG Mengozzi indicated that the fact that the tax system at 
issue may be classii ed as state aid incompatible with the 
common market and that it is incumbent on the Commis-
sion, under the Treaty, to check such compatibility cannot 
therefore entitle a Member State to take unilateral meas-
ures against that system intended to counter its effects, 
which would infringe one of the fundamental freedoms 
provided for by the Treaty.58 In other words, there is no 
place for ‘self-protection’ under European Law.59
On the other hand, AG Mengozzi strongly criticized the 
very concept of cohesion, describing it as ‘rather diffuse’ or 
even ‘mysterious’.60 Member States have often relied on it 
in among other types of justii cation, often recognized as 
being overriding requirements for the purposes of the case 
law, such as the effectiveness of i scal supervision, combat-
ing tax evasion or tax fraud, or even the loss of tax revenue, 
which does not, however, come under those requirements. 
Bearing this in mind, a possible justii cation for the rules 
contained in the AStG should be analyzed under the scope 
of anti-abuse provisions, where the very core of the AG’s 
analysis of potential grounds for justii cation really lies.61
On this issue, AG Mengozzi elaborated its construc-
tion on the basis of the approach to CFC rules in Cad-
bury Schweppes. In that ruling, the ECJ accepted that a 
tax measure that restricts the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom may be justii ed if that measure has the specii c 
purpose of precluding from a tax benei t wholly artii cial 
arrangements whose purpose is to circumvent or escape 
the law of the Member State concerned. According to this, 
a tax measure (that is, CFC rules) cannot be considered 
proportioned if it excludes categorically and generally any 
allegedly artii cial arrangement from the benei t of a tax 
advantage without allowing the national courts to make a 
case-by-case analysis taking account the particular features 
of each case (essentially referring to physical existence in 
terms of premises, staff, and equipment).
Applying these criteria to Columbus Container Services, 
AG Mengozzi stated that paragraph 20(2) and (3) of the 
AStG appeared to be based on an irrefutable presump-
tion that a purely artii cial arrangement exists when the 
conditions referred to in that provision are met.62 Such 
an approach seems to be disproportionate to the objective 
pursued.
Following previous rulings, the AG coni rmed that it 
was up to the national court to determine whether the 
German provisions allowed a case-by-case analysis. How-
ever, he insisted on the necessity of considering the level 
of employment of Columbus Containers in Belgium63 and 
rejected the fact that a company involved in activities with 
regard to holding and managing capital would not engage 
in actual economic activities in the host Member State.64
It is difi cult to add something or refuse this approach. 
Under this premise, it is difi cult to consider Columbus 
Container Services an artii cial construction not integrated 
in its host state.65 The restriction does not seem justii ed.
Notes
57 CFE, 8; de la Feria (2008), n. 51, 431-432; Lang (2008) n. 2, 692-695; Cordewener (2008), n. 2, 230-232. Even those who reject horizontal comparability have to admit 
that if the Court had found that there was a restriction, there would have been good reason to assume that the restriction was not justii ed (Kessler & Eicke, n. 13, 588).
58 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 167. In the same sense, see AG Leger (paras 57-58) in his opinion on the case Cadbury Schweppes 
and AG Geelhoed (para. 63) in his opinion on the case ACT.
59 Lang (2008), n. 2, 693.
60 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 190.
61 Cordewener (2008), n. 2, 231.
62 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 178.
63 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 180.
64 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 181.
65 Cordewener (2008), n. 2, 232.
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4.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLUMBUS 
CONTAINER SERVICES
This contribution would be uni nished if, leaving apart 
our critical perspective, we did not consider the conse-
quences of this ruling for further developments in respect 
of highly disputed issues and in relation to company taxa-
tion in Europe. Of course, we have no capability of fore-
telling what the future will bring, specially when referring 
to rather strange and enigmatic rulings; nevertheless, we 
must be capable of inserting a judgment into the logical 
structure of previous rulings and using it to solve further 
problems. So, we will try to ascertain whether Columbus 
Container Services implies a change in relation to the tra-
ditional case law of the ECJ on anti-avoidance rules. As a 
i nal thing, we will briel y consider how Columbus Container 
Services might inl uence specii c topics such as the princi-
ple of free choice of legal form in outbound  situations.
4.1.  Is Cadbury Schweppes Overruled?
One could consider that if the facts in Cadbury Schweppes 
and Columbus Container Services are pretty similar, the case 
law of the ECJ on anti-avoidance rules might have changed. 
Nevertheless, this might be a hasty conclusion, at least for 
CFC provisions, if we take into account latter pronounce-
ments of the Court in relation to this kind of rules. In 
fact, and despite certain nuances, the ECJ has come back 
to Cadbury Schweppes in its recent Order of 23 April 200866 
in the case Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group 
Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue.67 According 
to this, it seems more realistic to consider that Columbus 
Container Services has relaxed, to a certain extent, the strict 
requirements of its previous anti-abuse case law. The prob-
lem is to what extent and under which requirements.
A correct approach to the future signii cance of  Columbus 
Container Services could imply making a distinction 
between strict anti-avoidance rules (such as CFC rules) 
and provisions merely aimed at capital export neutral-
ity. The  Member State’s i scal autonomy would be more 
limited in the former, which are only admitted under 
the ‘wholly artii cial arrangement’ criterion. The latter 
measures might not be considered against EC Law if they 
do not imply different treatments for migrant and non-
migrant situations.
This approach could be a new sign of the compatibility 
of the credit method and capital export neutrality with EC 
Law and, to a certain extent, an explicit rider of Cadbury 
Schweppes that seemed to have sent a message in favour of 
the exemption method and the capital import neutrality.68 
This rel ection could display important consequences, for 
example, in relation to the switch-over clause introduced 
by the Working Group on the Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base (CCCTB) for foreign income received by 
eligible companies resident in the EU that have opted for 
the CCCTB or by eligible companies not resident in the 
EU that have opted for the CCCTB in respect of their EU 
Pes.69 The very draft document produced by the Working 
Group declared unclear whether or not the switch-over 
clause could lawfully be applied to intra-EU dividends 
considering the Columbus Container Services case, which, 
at that time, was still unsolved.70 Nevertheless, accord-
ing to the decision of the ECJ in the case, most authors 
agree that a switch-over clause such as that introduced for 
CCCTB purposes does not form a restriction on the Treaty 
Freedoms.71
In the same vein, the position of the ECJ in Columbus 
Container Services could help to reinforce the EU compat-
ibility of domestic measures designed to combat tax com-
petition within the EU, for instance, through the use of 
the credit method for double taxation relief. Likewise, 
one country could exclude the general application of the 
exemption method for double taxation relief when the for-
eign income is subject to a low level of taxation at source 
or when the income is characterized as passive income or 
when the activity that generates the foreign income was 
previously carried out in the home country by the same 
or a related taxpayer. In these cases, the application of 
the foreign tax credit instead of the exemption method 
pursues to neutralize (tax) advantages provided by Mem-
ber States or to avoid the migration of companies (or the 
delocalization of economic activities) to the territory of 
Member States.
There is no doubt that the application of this kind 
of measures can generate restriction to the freedom of 
Notes
66 C-201/05.
67 In addition, the High Court of England and Wales ruled on 4 July 2008 in the case of Vodafone2 in favour of a taxpayer who had to pay taxes according to the UK CFC 
rules for the proi ts of its Luxembourgian holding company. The principles of Cadbury Schweppes have been also applied in this ruling. See for this procedure Gnaedinger, 
‘Vodafone Wins Challenge Against CFC Law’, Tax Notes International (Jul. 2008): 172-173, and Sykes, ‘Vodafone 2 v. HMRC: The Roaming Boundaries of European 
Community Law’, BTR no. 5 (2008): 536 et eq.
68 On the position of the ECJ on methods for avoiding double taxation, see Calderón Carrero & Martín Jiménez, ‘La jurisprudencia del TJCE en materia tributaria’, Convenios 
i scales internacionales y Fiscalidad de la UE (Valencia: CISS, 2008): 839 et seq. Cordewener & Schnitger, n. 18: 50 et seq.
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70 Ibid., n. 39.
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Possible Elements of a Technical Outline: The “Switch-over” Clause’, in Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, eds Michael Lang et al. (Wien: Linde, 2008), 783, with 
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 establishment, and when the principal goal of such meas-
ures is to prevent abusive arrangements, such measures 
would only be compatible with EC law if they are shaped 
in a proportionate way. However, it is far from clear 
whether or not the neutralization of advantages (of eco-
nomic and tax nature) provided by other Member States 
could constitute a legitimate reason that would justify a 
restriction to a fundamental freedom.
In this context, we think that the use of the horizontal 
comparability analysis can be needed in order to establish 
the existence of a restriction to a fundamental freedom, as 
it occurred in Cadbury Schweppes. All in all, it seems that 
the ECJ jurisprudence tends to characterize this kind of 
measures that neutralize tax advantages but do not consti-
tute anti-abuse rules in a strict sense, as quasi-restrictions 
that are not contrary to the EC Treaty.
This approach is not, however, exempt from prob-
lems. To distinguish between strict anti-avoidance rules 
and provisions merely aimed at capital export neutrality 
might not be an easy task. Switch-over clauses are, in fact, 
commonly qualii ed as anti-avoidance rules. And this is 
strictly related to the second problematic issue of this 
approach.
This simple distinction between anti-avoidance rules 
and provisions aimed at capital export neutrality goes 
perhaps too far because the ECJ does not discriminate 
among the latter measures. In this respect, provisions in 
line with capital export neutrality might be designed in 
a non-selective manner applying, for example, a switch-
over clause irrespective of the rate at which the income 
in question is taxed at source. But, as it is the case for the 
provisions contained in the AStG, these measures can also 
be coni gured depending on a certain level of taxation in 
the host state. Nevertheless, the immediate consequence 
of the non-admission of horizontal pairs of comparison 
is considering both situations as not restrictive of funda-
mental freedoms. The question might be again whether 
or not selective and non-selective clauses deserve identical 
treatment. As stated before, a common market approach 
advises a different treatment.72
As has been said, the problem with the judgment is not 
what the Court says but what it does not say.73 By merely 
rejecting horizontal comparability, the ECJ judgment in 
Columbus Container Services not only lacks a proper founda-
tion but also makes it difi cult to predict its consequences.
4.2.  Free Choice of Legal Form in 
Outbound Situations: Classii cation 
of Foreign Entities
Columbus Container Services has shed light on the scope of the 
principle of free choice of legal form under EU law require-
ments. Before the ruling, the application of the principle 
to outbound investments was highly disputed. On the 
one hand, and as described before, the ECJ had developed 
a vested case law on neutrality of legal form for inbound 
investments. On the other hand, some scholars defended 
the application of case law on recognition of legal form 
rules of other MS (in cases such as Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og 
Selskabsstyrelsen74 or Überseering and Inspire Art75) to tax 
 matters.76 Despite it all, AG Mengozzi and the ECJ rejected 
the very existence of a principle of free choice of legal form 
in outbound investments using similar arguments:
At the current stage of development of Community 
law, it does not require Member States to recognize 
in their territory the legal and tax status afforded by 
the domestic law of the other Member States to enti-
ties which carry out their economic activities there;77 it 
must be recalled that the i scal autonomy… also means 
that the Member States are at liberty to determine the 
conditions and the level of taxation for different types 
of establishments chosen by national companies or 
partnerships operating abroad, on condition that those 
companies or partnerships are not treated in a manner 
that is discriminatory in comparison with comparable 
national establishments.78
The grounds for these statements might be different in 
both cases.
Notes
72 This is in our opinion the position defended by AG Mengozzi in Columbus: ‘The unfavourable tax treatment in the present case does not result purely from application of 
the different tax legislations of the Member States, but from the choice made in the German tax legislation to set the mechanism for off-setting tax levied abroad on the 
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legislations of the Member States. However, that is certainly not the case here’ (AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, paras 129-130).
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74 Case No. C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen. See also the SEVIC case (ECJ ruling of 13 Dec. 2005, C-411/03) and Cartesio (ECJ ruling of 16 Dec. 2008, 
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of International Taxation: Essays in Honour of Maarten J Ellis, eds van Arendonk, Engelen & Jensen (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005): 478 et seq; Wassermeyer & Schönfeld (2006), 
n. 53, at sec. 20 Anm. 58, Lfg. 58; Mai 2006.
77 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, 29 Mar. 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Containers, para. 41.
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In relation to the ruling, the rejection of the principle 
of free choice of legal form is an immediate consequence of 
a strict migrant/non-migrant test approach. Under refusal 
of horizontal pairs of comparison, there is no place for a 
principle of free choice of legal form in outbound invest-
ments. Nevertheless, AG Mengozzi accepts horizontal 
comparability but also refuses a general EU requirement 
for the Member States to recognize legal and tax statutes 
afforded by other Member States. But this also seems to 
be logical. Using the very words of Mengozzi, the pos-
sible restriction on the freedoms of movement is not to 
be found in the classii cation of Columbus as a permanent 
establishment under German tax law.79 In short, it is not 
the switch-over clause or the rules on recognition of for-
eign entities that give rise to a restriction on the funda-
mental freedoms but its selective coni guration (using the 
low-tax criterion of selectivity).
Whatever the reasons might be for this refusal, it might 
display signii cant consequences for several domestic pro-
visions on classii cation of foreign entities or look-through 
rules passed in several Member States such as Germany,80 
The Netherlands,81 or Spain.82 These rules could only be 
considered restrictive of fundamental freedoms if the com-
panies or partnerships operating in other Member States 
are treated in a manner that is discriminatory in compari-
son with comparable national establishments. This would 
require the search of a domestic legal form that might 
be considered similar or equivalent to its foreign pair. 
Nevertheless, as international practice has showed, these 
comparisons might be a difi cult task in many cases.83 
Therefore, the existence of a restriction, even in the ‘clear’ 
approach of Columbus Container Services, might not be that 
evident and the consequences of the ruling in this i eld are 
far from predictable.
